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THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE EVIDENCE AS A
SUBSTITUTE FOR SPECIAL BILLS OF EXCEPTIONS
L. CARLIN*

Questions of trial error pertaining to the evidence usually
involve a consideration of court action with reference to
some one of the following things: (1) the rejection of
proffered evidence on objection; (2) the admission of evidence over objection; or (3) the effect to be given to the evidence, predminently the probative sufficency of the evidence. The first two considerations usually call for a decision as to the propriety of questions or answers involved in
the examination of witnesses. The third consideration has,
perhaps, assumed its greatest importance under the inquiry
whether the evidence is sufficient to support a verdict.
Whatever the nature of the inquiry into the propriety of the
court's ruling, since the evidence is not per se a part of the
record, for purposes of review in an appellate court, it is
necessary that the evidence, or the particular part of it to
which the question of error is directed, be brought into the
The process of incorporarecord by a bill of exceptions.'
tion by bill of exceptions involves a proffer of the evidence,
an objection, the ruling of the court on the objection, and
the proper authentication of all these matters in the bill
of exceptions, which is then made a part of the record by
an order of court or the certificate of the trial judge. In
the early days of trial procedure, the courts did not have
the aid of stenographic reporters. Hence in those days the
evidence, as a whole, was not literally recorded and preserved in the form of a transcript. Consequently, if any
question arose as to the ruling of the trial court on the
sufficiency of the evidence as a whole, such as the question
whether the evidence was sufficient to support a verdict,
for purposes of review in the appellate court the trial court
* Professor of Law West Virginia University.
See 25 W. VA. LAw QuM 198 et. seq.
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certified the facts of the case as established by the evidence.2 A! bill of exceptions containing such a certification
of facts was, of course, of no use where the objection and
exception went to a specific question or answer, and particularly' where ;the supposed point of error involved the
form of the question or-answer, In such instances, it was
necessary to resort to special bills of exceptions incorporating literally the subject matter of the objection and stating
the objection and exception. The'practice of "certifying
the facts" of the case for purposes of appellate review continued in West Virginia long after it hhd become customary
to employ stenographic reporters for purposes of the trial.
It was not until 1891 that, by way of amendment of section
9 of chapter 131 of.the. Code relating to bills of exceptions,
it was enacted that, "if the action or opinion of the trial
court, be upon any, question.involving the evidence, or any
p.art thereof, * * * ,the court shall certify the evidence
touching such question * *V, The effect of this amendment has been to reverse the former practice. The result
has been that, in any case where the trial court would
formerly have certified the facts of the case as established
by the evidence, it is now almost the universal 4practice to
certify a literal transcript of the evidence itself.
Although the writer recalls no statement in the books
assigning any particular reason why this amendment was
enacted, it-may easily be surmised that it was enacted because.litigants had,, for.some special reason, become dissatisfied with. the.,old practice of "certifying the facts." No
doubt,.cases arose where- litigants believed that the facts
where inaccurately stated in.the certification, and suspected
that the decision in, the appellate court might have been
diTerent if the case. had been reviewed in the full and
direct light of the .evidence. Hence perhaps the primary
legislative intent was to give the appellate court an opportunity, to. draw its own conclusions. as to what facts are
established by the. evidence,, in lieu of depending upon, the
Johnson v. Burns. .80-,W. Va. .658, 20, S.. B. 686.{1894).
Idea.S
t Rather strangelyn it. might seem, the amendment has been. construed to be directory, rather than mandatory. King v. Jordan, 46 W. Va. 106, 82 S. E. 1022 (1899).
"Section 9. chapter 181, Code 1891, does not prohibit the Supreme Court of Appeala
from considering n case where the facts proven on the trial, and not the evidence,
are certified." Idem. This case, however, seems, to stand almost alone. It seema to
have been cited for the proposition in question only in the case of In re Temple Society,
90 W. Va. 441, 111 S. E. 687 (1922).
2
8
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conclusions of the trial court. Wherefore, it may be surmised that the 'chief end in view -was to aid the appellate
court in forming an accurate, first-hand estimate of the
weight of the evidence in the aggregate, rather than to present in literal form parts of the evidence forming the subject matter of special objections and exceptions. It will be
perceived, however, that the new practice of embodying a
literal transcript of. all the evidence in one bill of exceptions, and thus bringing it all in its proper sequence before
the appellate court, presented new possibilities as to saving
objections and exceptions with reference to specific questions and answers. Since the stenographic reporter records and transcribes not only the literal questions' and answers, but also objections and exceptions interposed and
saved by counsel, the transcript of the evidence, embodied
in, a single ,bill of exceptions, contains in the aggregate
practically all that under the former practice would have
been made to appear only by separate bills of exceptions
dealing with each separate objection and exception. 'There
is la~king' only such, matter as is inserted in special bills
of exceptions by way of explanation or inducement, for
the 'purpose of sho'ing the application of the isolated
question or answer to other parts of the evidence or, record.
When a question or answer is separited from its context,
such an explanation by way of inducement is of -course
often absolutely necessary; but -when the whole of the evidence is certified, literally and in its proper sequence, the
application and effect of.a specific question or answer, and
any objection or exception pertaining thereto, may be determined from the context.
Whatever the possibilities, subsequent to the amendment
of 1891, of dispensing with numerous separate bills of exceptions duplicating objections and exceptions, contained in
the bill of exceptions embodying the transcript of the evidence, it has nevertheless continued to be the usual practice, whether from definite choice or from the general force
of inertia growing out of long-established precedent, to use
special bills of exceptions for the purpose of 'preserving
objections and exceptions relating to the admission or rejection of evidence. On the other hand, no few instances
will be noted in the cases where practitioners, sometimes
to their regret, have relied upon the bill of exceptions con-
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taining the transcript of the evidence as dispensing with
the necessity for such special bills of exceptions. Hence
it would seem very desirable to determine, as far as practicable, to what extent and in what manner there may be
an option, or alternative, as to the. different methods of
practice.
Without any attempt in. this brief discussion to review
specifically all the various Icases dealing with the question
since the enactment of the amendment of 1891, some of
which seem to be directly in conflict and others of which
may to some degree be "reconciled or distinguished, it will
be sufficient to note that, in general, two different views,
each based on a more or less distinct line of decisions, have
at one time or another prevailed.
It first seems to have been the view of the court, following from certain conclusions reached in Gregory's Adm'nr v.
Ohio River R. R. Co.,5 a case decided -not long after the
enactment of the amendment, that objections apd exceptions to the admission or rejection-of evidence, although
fully noted in the transcript of the evidence embodied in a
bill of exceptions, would not be considered by the appellate
court unless (1)-the objection and exception were made
the subject of a special bill of exceptions, or (2) the ruling
of the court on the objection should be specifically assigned
as a ground of error on the motion for a new trial. The
same view has found expression in a series of subsequent
decisions continuing down to a recent date.6 A fair statement, in condensed form, of the rule evolving out of these
decisions will be found in State v. Jones,7 decided in 1916:
"Rulihgs of the trial court on the admissibility of evidence will not be considered on writ of error, unless the
evidence admitted or rejected is made part of the record
537 W. Va. 606, 16 S. E. 819 (1893). Although this case contains statements
which led to the series of cases cited below sustaining the rule as stated in the
text, the point actually decided was that, if a party assigns certain grounds in
support of his motion for a new trial, he waives other grounds not assigned, although
appearing by way of objection and'exception in the transcript of the evidence. The case
has been so distinguished by Judge Brannon in Kay v. Glade Creek & R. R. Co., infra.
6 Halstead r. Horton; 38 W. Va. 727, 18 S. E. 953 (1894); State v. Bingham, 42
,W. Va. 284, 24 S. E. 888 (1896); State v. Henaghan, 73 W. Va. 708, 81 S. E. 89
(1914) ; Ireland v. Smith, 73 W. Va. 76S, 81 S. E. 542 (1914); Parr v. Howell, 74
W. Va. 413, 82 S. E. 126 (1914) ; Bartlett v. Bank of Mannington, 77 W. Va. 829, 87
S. E. 444 (1915) ; State v. Jones, 77 W. Va: 635, 88 S. E. 45 (1916) ; Guyandotto Coal
Co. v. Virginian Electric & Machine Works, 94 W. Va. 300, 188 S. E. 512 (1028);
Trippett v. Monongahela West Penn Public Service Co., 180 S. E. 483 (W. Va. 1025)
'SuPra.
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by special bills of exception or assigned as cause for a
new trial on motion therefor, although all the evidence is
made part of the record by a general bill of exceptions."
Different reasbns, in some respects not altogether consistent, are given to sustain this view. It is said that the point.
of error, unless so saved or brought to the attention of the
trial court, must be considered as having been waived; that
it is not fair to the trial court, nor economical as a method
of seeking a reversal of the trial court's ruling, to urge in
the appellate court a ground for reversal that was not
urged on the motion for a new trial; that any other method
would not sufficiently point out, especially to the appellate
court, the ground of error upon which the party relies for
reversal. Particularly, it was emphasized in what may
perhaps be considered the leading case8 in this line of decisions, if a party assigned certain grounds of error on a
motion for a new trial and failed to call the attention of
the trial court to other objections and exceptions noted in
the transcript of the evidence, he must be considered as
having abandoned such objections and exceptions unless
he embodied them in special bills of exceptions.
The first variation from the views indicated above seems
to have come in Kay v. Glade Creek & R. R. Co., decided
in 1900. In this case, the court says:
"Where a stenographic report of evidence is made part
of the certificate of evidence upon a motion for a new
trial, and it shows objections to questions or evidence,
and the rulings of the court thereon, and that such rulings were excepted to, and the particular question or
evidence complained of is specified distinctly in the motion for a new trial, or in an assignment of error, or in
brief of counsel, so that the appellate court can readily
and safely find the particular question or evidence to
which the exception relates, the appellate court will consider the matter excepted to, though there is no formal
bill of exceptions thereto; but such matter will not be
considered without such specifications, even though such
report of evidence notes such objections and exceptions."
Judge Brannon, who wrote the opinion in this case,
allows no room for doubt that the bill of exceptions con8

Gregory's Adm'r v. Ohio River R. R. Co., note 5 supra.
0 47 W. Va. 467, 35 S. E. 973 (1900).
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taining the evidence brings all the objections and exceptions noted therein into the record. The only obstacle that
he perceives in the way of dispensing with special bills of
exceptions is the fact that they serve the purpose of pointing out to the appellate court the specific objections and
exceptions relied upon for reversal; and he disposes of this
difficulty by indicating that specifications of error may be
made, not only in special bills of exceptions or by way of
assigning grounds on the motion for a new trial, but also
either (1) in the assignment of errors, or (2) in the brief of
counsel. It will be recalled that prior cases had said that
such specifications must be made either (1) on the motion
for a new trial, or (2) in special bills of exceptions. Of
course, if the specifications are made only in the assignment
of errors or in the brief of counsel, they will aid only the
appellate court on review, and not the trial court on the
motion for a new trial; but he calls attention to the fact
that the trial court has heard all the evidence, presumably
has taken notes as to all crucial and doubtful matters, and
hence is in a much better position than the appellate court to
act on the motion for a new trial without any additional
specifications of error. It will be noted that the court predicates its statements upon the assumption that "a stenographic report of evidence is made a part of the certificate
of evidence upon a motion for a new trial." Perhaps this
qualification is intended as a satisfaction, although a rather
artificial one it would seem, of statements in prior cases to
the effect that objections and exceptions noted in the tran.
script of the evidence will be treated as waived unless
brought to the attention of the trial court by special bills of
exceptions or specifically assigned as error on the motion
for a new trial. It is rather apparent, however, that Judge
Brannon in this case considers that the possibility of waiver
has little to do with the question in controversy.
Kay v. Glade Creek & R. R. Co. has been approved and
followed in a series of subsequent decisions.' 0 The result.
as already noted, has been two conflicting lines of decisions,
noBodkin v. Arnold, 48 W. Va. 108, 114, 85 S. E. 980 (1900) ; Foley V. City of
Huntington,
W. Va.
896, 41
E. 118 (1902)
llcClanaban
418,
60 S. E. 88261 (1908)
; Bank
v. S.Houston,
66 W7.; Va.
386. 842. v.66Caul,
S. B.68 W.
466 Va.
(1909);
Wright v. Ridgey, 67 W. Va. 319, 67 S. E. 787 (1910) ; Walters V. Appalachian Power
Co., 76 W. Va. 676, 683, 84 S. E. 617 (1916); Bond v. National Fire Insurance Co.,
"17 W. Va. 786, 88 S. E. 889 (1916) ; Hinton Milling Co. v. Now River Milling Co., 78
W. 'Va. 814, 88 S. E. 1079 (1916).
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the court intermittently shifting from one to the other as
each new case was decided, until the decision, in 1916, of
Hinton Milling Co. v. New River Milling Co." In this case,
a motion was made to set aside the verdict and grant a
new trial. No grounds whatever were assigned in support
of the motion. The court, however, acted upon the motion, overruling it, and an exception was taken to the ruling
of the court. The transcript of the evidence, embodied in
a general bill of exceptions, showed many exceptions to
rulings of the court during the trial upon the introduction
of evidence. These exceptions were not shown by special
bills of exceptions. Hence the court was under the necessity of deciding whether the general bill of exceptions was
sufficient for purposes of review. In undertaking to decide
this question, the court, recognizing the confusion that had
prevailed in the past with reference to what should be the
proper or permissible practice, and in order "that there
may be no confusion or misunderstanding among the profession or circuit courts upon the subject,"1 2 undertakes to
state specifically and at length to what extent and in what
manner objections and exceptions noted in the transcript
of the evidence may be relied upon without the aid of special bills of exceptions and without specific assignments of
error on the motion for a new trial. The court adopts the
reasoning of Kay v. Glade Creek & R. R. Co. and goes even
farther. It is recognized, as it always has been, subject
to certain exceptions, that a motion to set aside the verdict
and grant a new trial "is absolutely essential" as a prerequisite to seeking appellate relief. However, it is decided
that this prerequisite is fully satisfied by merely making
the motion, without assigning any grounds whatever in
support of the motion, provided the motion be entertained
and acted upon by the trial court. Hence, of course, the
court has utterly abandoned any idea to the effect that
the movant has waived his exceptions unless he has brought
them to the attention of the trial court by special bills of
exceptions or by specific assignments of error on the motion,
although the practice of making specific assignments of all

1SumPa.
12 Italics ours.
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errors relied upon, in fairness and as an aid to the trial
court, is commended. Judge Mason, who wrote the opinion, says :13
"It is well settled in this state that the appellate court
will not review rulings of the trial court made during the
trial by a jury, unless the erroneous rulings are in some
way specifically pointed out and brought to the attention
of the court, but is it essential that this should be done in
the motion for a new trial? The practice in this state
is to specify grounds upon the motion to set aside a verdict and grant a new trial. Danks v. Rodeheaver, supra;
Gregory v. Railroad Co., 37 W. Va. 606; Hughes v.
Frum, 41 W. Va. 445. We do not question the propriety
of this practice; it is entirely proper; but is the omission
in the motion to state grounds fatal, where the grounds
for the motion otherwise appear?"
Further in the opinion, 14 this query is answered as follows:
"Where the testimony is taken by a shorthand reporter, duly appointed and sworn, the report should be
preserved in extenso, and made part of the record of the
case by being incorporated into and made part of the
bill of exceptions certifying the evidence. When there
is a motion to set aside a verdict overruled and excepted
to, and a bill of exceptions certifying all the evidence,
such bill of exceptions will be considered by an appellate
court without any other or special bill of exceptions, as
to all facts properly certified therein. Where the certificate of evidence includes the notes of the shorthand
reporter, and such notes contain the rulings of the court
in receiving or rejecting evidence during the trial, and
,exceptions made thereto at the time. such rulings may
be noticed by the appellate court without special bills of
exceptions, provided such rulings are specifically Pointed
out in the motion for a new trial, the assignment of errors, or brief of counsel 5 but not otherwise. The party
who objected to the rulings, and excepted, should have
"thebenefit of his exceptions noted in the bill of exceptions
of the evidence, but to do so he should be required to
point out in some way to the appellate court the Particular rulings to which he objects. * * * By following this
rule the appellate court will have all the information, and
in as accessible a form as it would have were the alleged
errors spread upon the record on motion for a new trial
or specified by special bills of exceptions. According to
1 P.
14

818.

Pp. 821-2.

15 Italics ours.
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this ruling, while it is essential that there should be a
motion in the trial court before the judgment is entered,
to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial, -and exception taken at the time, to the ruling of the trial court
refusing to set aside the verdict, yet it is not essential
that the motion should state the grounds upon which
the motion is based, to save to the party "making the motion the alleged errors noted in such bill of exceptions,
provided the rulings complained of are pointed out in
the appellate court as hereinbefore indicated."
It is plain that the court, in the Milling Company Case,
intended definitely to adopt and perpetuate the practice
approved in Kay v. Glade Creek & R. R. Co. and subsequent cases in accord. This is indicated by the fact that
the latter case is cited and quoted with approval. That
the court was conscious of the contrary line of decisions.
and intended impliedly at the least to supersede them, or
politely to overrule them, is indicated by the following
language :1
"Some of our decisions may seem to indicate a different ruling from the views here expressed, but upon examination they will be found to apply to the phases of
the particular cases then under consideration."
It may be conceded that some of the prior cases which the
court evidently had in mind may be distinguished, as Judge
Brannon, in Kay v. Glade Creek & R. R. Co., distinguished
17
the case of Gregory's Adm'r v. Ohio River R. R. Co.,
where the point actually decided was that if a party assigned certain grounds on his motion for a new trial, other
grounds not so assigned, although noted by way of objection and exception in the transcript of the evidence, would
be treated as waived. However, it is submitted that in many
of the cases the general statements and the points actually
adjudicated are directly at variance with the holding in the
Milling Company Case.
Considering the extended and specific statements of this
case, based on actual adjudication, intended to settle a
point of practice which had been controverted in the past
on more than one occasion, and bearing in mind the avowed
purpose for which they were made, "that there may be no
117 P.
N.

323.
5 ouvrP.
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confusion or misunderstanding among the profession or
circuit courts upon the subject," it would have seemed that
those seeking for the proper rule of practice would have
been justified'in looking to the Milling Company Case alone
and ignoring the various prior cases laying down a different rule. However, in the light of recent decisions, the
question seems to be still in doubt. In Guyandotte Coal Co.
v. Virginian Electric & Machine Works,18 decided in 1923,
it is said:
"We find numerous assignments of error in plaintiff's
petition, many of which are also assigned in the brief of
its counsel. There are many of these errors referied to
in the plaintiff's petition which go to the introduction of
testimony.'* * * There are no special bills of exceptions

setting up these questions and exceptions or giving the
answers to them. This court has, in many cases, held
that: 'Errors in the rulings of the trial court upon admission and rejection of evidence are deemed to have been
waived if they are not made grounds of the motion for
a new trial, nor subjects of special bills of exceptions
showing the evidence and the ruling of the court thereon., "
Various cases decided prior to the Milling Company Case
are cited and quoted with approval. The Milling Company
Case is not mentioned. That the court is undertaking to follow the full rule and authority of cases prior and contra to
the Milling Company Case, is further indicated by the following paragraph in which the court quotes from State v.
Henaghan:19

" 'This court does not consider, and will treat as
waived, a claim that evidence was improperly admitted
over objection and exception, unless by bill of exceptions
attention is directed to the evidence complained of. A
bill of exceptions making all the evidence in the case
part of the record will not avail, though therein is noted
the introduction of such evidence and the objection and
exception thereto, unless the record discloses reliaice on
such objection in support of a motion for a new trial.' "
Again, in Trippett V. Monongahela West Penn Public
Service Co.,O decided in 1925, although it is not clear that
the statement was necessary for a decision of the case, it
is said:
N. 6 oupra.
"iden.
so Idem
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"Objection is made to the consideration of the questions thus sought to be presented on the ground that the
evidence complained of was not made the subject of special bills of exceptions, nor specifically presented to the
court on the motion for a new trial. This proposition is
well fortified by prior decisions rendered here; and we
shall give no further consideration to the points of error
based thereon."
The Milling Company Case is not mentioned in either of
these two later decisions. In both of them the cases which
the Milling Company Case was apparently intended to
supersede are cited and approved. The Guyandotte Case,
on the basis of actual adjudication, seems to be in direct
conflict with the Milling Company Case. Was the Milling Company Case inadvertently overlooked in deciding the
later cases? Or was there a definite intention to repudiate
the rule of practice which it sanctions?
Logically, it is believed that there is much to be said in
favor of the rule laid down in the Milling Company Case.
The primary function of a bill of exceptions is to bring into
the record something that is not per se a part of the record.
The bill of exceptions containing a transcript of the evidence certainly can be accepted as bringing into the record
all objections and exceptigns noted therein. Hence special
bills of exceptions should not be necessary for this purpose.
Whether points of error not called to the attention of the
trial court on a motion for a new trial will be treated as
waived, it is believed is a question independent of the law
relating to bills of exceptions. Usually, the mere fact that
a party excepts to the ruling of a court is taken as an indication that any error committed on the ruling is not waived.
The bill of exceptions is something that comes later. In
fact, a party does not know whether it is necessary for him
to assume the usually burdensome task of preparing bills
of exceptions until the court has ruled on the motion for a
new trial. In many of the cases cited, it is definitely assumed, if not stated, that a special bill of exceptions is an
absolute substitute, seemingly at any time and for all purposes, for a specific assignment of error on the motion for
a new trial. Is this logical? If the special bill of exceptions is prepared before the motion for a new trial, assuming that the doctrine of waiver has any application, why
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should not the special bill of exceptions, the same as an
exception noted in the transcript of the evidence, be considered as waived if the point of error which it is intended
to save is not called to the attention of the trial court on
the motion for a new trial? On the other hand, if the special bill of exceptions is prepared after the motion for a
new trial, how can it, under any conceivable circumstances,
so far as the question of waiver is concerned, be looked
upon as a substitute for specific assignments of error on the
motion for a new trial? It may very well be argued, as a
matter of policy, that a party should not be permitted to
urge in the appellate court points of trial error not made
the basis in the trial court of his motion for a new trial
The arguments in favor of such a policy are obvious. But
would not the very force of such arguments repel any idea
that the same function could properly be performed by
special bills of exceptions? It is believed that the cases
have unnecessarily and unprofitably confused the functions
of bills of exceptions with the necessity, to the extent that
it is recognized, of seeking correction of error in the trial
court before applying for appellate relief. This confusion,
leading to a lack of uniformity in reasoning and to conflict
in the decisions, seemingly has prevented the court from
establishing definite and permanent rules with reference to
either bills of exceptions or the requirements on a motion
for a new trial. The weight of the court's reasoning has
shifted from questions of waiver to purely mechanical questions of pointing out error; from questions of rendering aid
to the trial court to considerations of convenience in appellate procedure; from recognition of the primary function
of a bill of exceptions as being to bring something into the
record to the emphasis of its,. perhaps, secondary function
of pointing out error. So far as the question of pointing
out grounds of error is concerned, it is conceded by all the
cases that a proper way to specify points of alleged error
is to assign them on the motion for a new trial. So assigning them will serve all purposes of appellate procedure and
at the same time will aid the trial court in ruling on the
motion. But, as Judge Brannon indicates, there is no necessity that the trial court be so aided. The judge presiding
at the trial has heard all the evidence and, presumably, has
taken full notes covering all important matters; particu-
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larly, it would seem, of all doubtful matters as to which
his rulings have been questioned by way of exceptions. As
to specifying grounds of error for purposes of appellate
review, it would seem that this may safely be done in the
assignment of errors or in the brief of c~unsel. From a
purely mechanical point of view, it is believed that there
is something to be said in favor of dispensing with special
bills of exceptions relating to the evidence. They duplicate objections and exceptions already contained in the
transcript of the evidence and they further bring in additional matter in the nature of inducement, thus adding to
the size and the cost of the record. There is, however,
one respect in which it is conceivable that special bills of
exceptions might be an aid to the appellate court. The
explanation or inducement in the ordinary special bill of
exceptions relating to the evidence would in some instances
tend to relieve the appellate court from the necessity of
examining the context of the evidence in order to determine the applicability of the objection and exception. But
since the appellate court is usually under the necessity of
reading the whole evidence for other purposes, and thus
becomes familiar with the context, the writer questions
the expediency of requiring special bills of exceptions
chiefly ror the purpose of dispensing with an examination
of the context. Afer all is said, however, in favor of either
rule of practice, it must be conceded, perhaps, that it is
not so important to determine which course is the better
one to pursue as it is to be able to know which method of
procedure it is safe to follow as the permanent rule of practice.
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